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Abstract
This article examines the general tort law governing liability for torts
committed by others and compares it to the law of indirect infringement for
patents, copyrights, and trademarks. There are a number of circumstances in
which the law imposes liability for torts committed by other persons. Liability is
imposed on an aider and abettor who gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to another person’s commission of a tort, provided the aider and
abettor actually knows the other person’s conduct is tortious. Liability is also
imposed on a party who induces another person to commit a tort if the inducer
either knows or should know of circumstances that would make the conduct
tortious. In addition, liability is imposed on a party who permits another person
to commit torts on the party’s premises or with the party’s instrumentalities if the
party knows the other person is acting or will act tortiously.
The law of indirect infringement for patents, copyrights, and trademarks
originally developed out of the general tort law, but it has diverged from the
general tort law in various ways. Since direct infringement is a statutory tort,
liability should not be imposed for indirect infringement when the general tort law
would not impose liability for other types of torts committed by other persons,
unless there are sound reasons for treating infringement differently than other
types of torts. Consequently, the general tort law may provide insight as to how
unsettled issues in the law of indirect infringement should be resolved. In
addition, identifying differences between the general tort law principles and the
law of indirect infringement reveals questionable case law that should be
reexamined.
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I. Introduction
The Supreme Court’s decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster1
incorporates the doctrine of inducing infringement from patent law into copyright law.

By

utilizing the existing doctrine from patent law, the Supreme Court provided some clarification of
the standards for liability for indirect infringement in copyright law. However, the Grokster
decision also raises questions about the proof required for inducing infringement with respect to
establishing intent and the possibility of defenses based on the defendant's mental state. For
example, would a defendant be liable for inducing another person to copy the plaintiff's
copyrighted work if the defendant believed (albeit erroneously) that the other person had a fair
use defense to a claim for copyright infringement? Principles from general tort law may suggest
an answer to this question as well as to other presently unsettled questions2 involving liability for

1

125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).

2

Other unsettled questions include: whether a defendant would be liable for
inducing a third person to infringe a patent if the defendant believed the patent was invalid,
whether a defendant would be liable for inducing a third person to infringe a trademark if the
defendant believed either that the trademark was invalid or the third person had a defense to
2

the indirect infringement of patents, copyrights and trademarks.
The law of indirect infringement has developed separately, but along parallel tracks in
patent, copyright and trademark law over the past hundred years. In all three areas, there are
circumstances where it is impractical for the owners of intellectual property to enforce their
rights against direct infringers, and the owners have sought remedies against other persons who
they claimed were responsible for indirect infringement of their intellectual property rights. The
applicable doctrines have varied somewhat from one field of intellectual property to another,
however. In patent law, third party liability has been imposed for contributory infringement and
inducing infringement. Copyright law has three separate doctrines for third party liability:
vicarious infringement, contributory infringement, and inducing infringement.

Third party

liability in trademark law has been imposed for inducing infringement and a failure to take
reasonable precautions against infringement. Although liability for the direct infringement of
patents, copyrights or trademarks is imposed on a strict liability basis,3 liability for indirect
infringement has generally required some sort of a showing of the third party’s intent, knowledge
or control with respect to the direct infringement. The particular requirements for indirect
infringement vary between patent, copyright and trademark law, and they appear to be still
evolving in the case law.
The law of indirect infringement of patents, copyrights and trademarks derived from
common law doctrines of joint liability for concerted action, aider and abettor liability, and
trademark infringement, whether a seller of a product would be liable for copyright or trademark
infringement by a third person who used the product to infringe, and whether an internet service
provider would be liable for copyright or trademark infringement by a user of its network.
3

See 15 U.S.C. § 1141(1)(a) (2000) (trademarks); 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000)
(copyrights); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (patents).
3

liability for permitting or directing the conduct of another.4 These common law doctrines have
evolved to produce an extensive and well-developed body of tort law that governs a person’s
liability for torts committed by another. Since the indirect infringement of a patent, copyright, or
trademark is a statutory tort,5 liability for indirect infringement represents a subset of this more
general body of tort law.6 In general, a person’s liability for a tort committed by another should
be dependent upon the person’s conduct, culpability, and relationship to the other person, rather
than whether the tort is a statutory tort, such as the infringement of intellectual property, or a
common law tort, such as trespass or negligence.
Unfortunately, the law of indirect infringement not only has become Balkanized within
intellectual property law between its constituent areas of patent, copyright and trademark law,
but it also has diverged from the general body of tort law. Cases and commentaries within each
substantive area of intellectual property law have tended to focus on that particular area, and they
have generally not considered the broader legal context in which the law of indirect infringement
operates. One indication of this tendency is the peculiar specialized terminology of vicarious,

4

See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2776
(2005) (“[The] doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are
well established in the law.”)
5

See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33
(1931) (“Infringement, whether direct or contributory, is essentially a tort, and implies invasion
of some right of the patentee.”).
6

Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984)
(“[V]icarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory
infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in
which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another.”).

4

contributory, and inducing infringement7 used to denote the various types of indirect
infringement. This specialized terminology has probably helped to promote variations in the
substantive requirements for indirect infringement between patent, copyright and trademark law.
A comparison of general tort law to the law of indirect infringement provides two
important benefits. First, the more developed body of general tort law may shed light on issues
in the law of indirect infringement for which precedent does not yet exist, and this may help to
resolve unsettled questions of indirect infringement law. Second, finding differences between
general tort law principles and indirect infringement law may flag aspects of indirect
infringement law that are unsound and need reexamination.
This Article examines the requirements for indirect infringement in patent, copyright and
trademark law.

Section II provides an overview of general tort law principles governing third

liability for torts committed by others. Section III covers indirect infringement under patent law,

7

“Vicarious” typically refers in tort law to liability imposed for any reason on a
person for the torts of another. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability §
13 (2000). In contrast, vicarious infringement refers to circumstances where a person is liable
for indirect infringement because the person has the right and ability to supervise infringing
conduct and has a direct financial interest in the infringing conduct. See Gershwin Publishing
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2nd Cir. 1971) (“[E]ven in the
absence of an employer-employee relationship one may be vicariously liable if he has the right
and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such
activities.”).
“Contributory” typically refers in tort law to the negligence of a plaintiff that causes
harm to the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965). In contrast,
contributory infringement has one meaning in patent law and a different meaning in copyright
law. In patent law, contributory infringement refers to the sale of a component of a patented
invention if the component is especially made for infringement of the patent and has no
substantial noninfringing use. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (liability of a contributory infringer). In
copyright law, contributory infringement refers to a person’s inducing, causing or contributing to
infringing conduct of another with knowledge of the infringing conduct. See Gershwin, 443 F.2d
at 1162 (“[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory'
5

where most of the intellectual property cases involving indirect infringement have arisen.
Sections IV and V address indirect infringement under copyright and trademark law,
respectively. This Article concludes that courts should refer to and consider general tort law
principles when analyzing the indirect infringement of patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
Moreover, the indirect infringement of patents, copyrights, and trademarks should conform to
general tort law principles in the absence of persuasive reasons otherwise.

II. Liability for Torts Committed by Others
There are a variety of grounds for holding a liable for a tort committed by another. The
grounds that are the most applicable to the indirect infringement of intellectual property rights
are: 1) liability for aiding and abetting torts, 2) liability for inducing torts, 3) liability for
permitting use of premises or instrumentalities, and 4) liability for employees and independent
contractors.8
A. Liability for Aiding and Abetting Torts
A significant basis for liability arises when a person aids and abets the commission of a
tort by another. This basis of liability is found in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b),
which provides: “For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one

infringer.”).
8

Other grounds for a person’s liability for another’s tort found in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts include: committing a tort in concert with another person (Id. § 876(a)),
committing a tort in the course of giving substantial assistance to another person (Id. § 876(c)),
acting negligently in employing the other person, (Id. § 877(b)), failing to exercise care in the
control of another who is likely to do harm (Id. § 877(d)), and confiding the performance of a
duty to protect a third person to another person who fails to perform the duty (Id. § 877(e)).

6

is subject to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, . . . .”9 Section
876(b) is based on the defendant’s giving substantial assistance or encouragement to the
tortfeasor, and it expressly requires the defendant to know that the other person’s conduct is
tortious. The defendant’s knowledge of the tortious nature of the tortfeasor’s conduct is crucial
to the defendant’s liability, because it provides a basis for the defendant’s culpability and avoids
holding parties liable who are not aware that they are unwittingly providing substantial
assistance to a tortfeasor. The significance of the knowledge requirement for aiding and abetting
liability was emphasized by Professor Ruder in the following example:
If all that is required in order to impose liability for aiding and abetting is that
illegal activity under the securities laws exists and that a secondary defendant,
such as a bank, gave aid to that illegal activity, the act of loaning funds to the
market manipulator would clearly fall within that category and would expose the
bank to liability for aiding and abetting. Imposition of such liability upon banks
would virtually make them insurers regarding the conduct of insiders to whom
they loan money. If it is assumed that an illegal scheme existed and that the bank's
loan or other activity provided assistance to that scheme, some remaining
distinguishing factor must be found in order to prevent such automatic liability.
The bank's knowledge of the illegal scheme at the time it loaned the money or
agreed to loan the money provides that additional factor.10
While proof of knowledge is essential for aider and abettor liability, knowledge may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence.11
The Comment to section 876(b) gives the following rationale for holding a defendant
9

Id. § 876(b).

10

David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
597, 630-31 (1972).
11

See Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Leahey Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 519, 535 (6th Cir.
2000) (“For the purposes of establishing aiding and abetting liability, ‘[t]he requisite intent and
7

liable for the tort of another: “Advice or encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a
tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same effect upon the
liability of the adviser as participation or physical assistance.”12 The Comment continues that
the defendant’s assistance or encouragement must be a substantial factor in causing the tort. In
addition, the Comment states that liability will be imposed regardless of whether the tort is
intentional or merely negligent, and regardless of whether the tortfeasor knows the conduct
constitutes a tort.

The Comment also explains that to determine whether the defendant’s

assistance or encouragement is substantial enough for the defendant to be liable, the following
factors should be considered: the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance provided
by the defendant, whether the defendant was present or absent at the time of the tort, the
defendant’s relation to the tortfeasor, and the defendant’s state of mind.
The application of section 876(b) is illustrated by Halberstam v. Welch.13 After Welch
killed her husband during a burglary of their home, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action
against both Welch and his live-in companion, Hamilton. A judgment for $5.7 million was
entered against both defendants, and the appellate court affirmed on the ground that Hamilton
was liable both for acting in concert with Welch and for aiding and abetting Welch. While
Hamilton did not participate directly in the burglary or killing, the court ruled that the evidence
supported the inference that she acted in concert with Welch in his burglary enterprise by helping
him dispose of stolen property and serving as his banker, bookkeeper, and secretary over a five
knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence.’ ”).
12

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) Comment a (1979) .

13

705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
8

year period.14
The court also ruled that Hamilton was liable as an aider and abettor, because she
provided substantial assistance to Welch knowing that Welch’s conduct was tortious.

While

there was no direct evidence that Hamilton knew of the killing, the appellate court decided that
the trial court’s inference that Hamilton knew Welch was involved in tortious activity was not
clearly erroneous.15 The court ruled that Hamilton was liable for the killing as an aider and
abettor, because the killing was a natural and foreseeable consequence of Welch’s tortious
activity.16 In applying the factors from the Comment to section 876(b) for determining whether
Hamilton’s assistance was sufficiently substantial to justify liability, the court emphasized
Hamilton’s state of mind as shown by her long term participation in the burglary enterprise.17
Section 876(b) would apply to the infringement of patents, copyrights or trademarks, if a
defendant gave substantial assistance or encouragement to a direct infringer, and the defendant
knew the direct infringer’s conduct was infringing.
B. Liability for Inducing Torts
Inducing another person’s tortious conduct is another basis for third party liability.
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(a) provides as follows for liability for inducing

14

Id. at 487.

15

Id.

16

Id. at 488. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979)
illustration 10 (co-conspirator to burglary is liable both for conversion and burning of house to
conceal the burglary because the burning was a foreseeable consequence of the burglary).
17

705 F.2d at 488.
9

another person to commit a tort: “For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct
of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or
should know of circumstances that would make the conduct tortious if it were his own, . . . .18
Section 877(a) overlaps with section 876(b), because in many cases, a defendant may both order
or induce another to commit a tort and also give substantial assistance or encouragement to the
tortfeasor. Section 877(a) differs from 876(b), though, because by requiring the defendant to
order or induce the tortious conduct, section 877(a) implies that the defendant must have a
specific intent to cause the tortfeasor to engage in the tortious conduct.

In contrast, the

defendant’s state of mind is only one of five factors that are to be considered in determining
whether the defendant’s assistance or encouragement was sufficient to warrant liability under
section 876(b).

Another significant difference between sections 877(a) and 876(b) is that

section 876(b) requires the defendant to have actual knowledge that the tortfeasor’s conduct
constitutes a breach of duty, while section 877(a) provides for liability if the defendant’s
knowledge that the tortfeasor’s conduct is tortious is either actual or constructive. Thus, while
section 877(a) requires a specific intent to induce tortious conduct, it requires only constructive
knowledge that the tortfeasor’s conduct is tortious. The Comment to section 877(a) notes that in
many situations a person giving the order or inducement would also be liable as a principal or
master under the law of agency, but section 877(a) provides an independent ground for
liability.19 Section 877(a) would apply to the infringement of patents, copyrights, or trademarks,

18

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(a) (1979).

19

Id. Comment a.
10

if the defendant ordered or induced the direct infringement, provided that the defendant had
actual or constructive knowledge that the direct infringer’s conduct was infringing.
C. Liability for Permitting Use of Premises or Instrumentalities
An additional basis for liability involves a defendant’s permitting a tortfeasor to use the
defendant’s property to commit torts. Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(c) provides:
“For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to
liability if he . . . (c) permits the other to act upon his premises or with his instrumentalities,
knowing or having reason to know that the other is acting or will act tortiously, . . . .20 The
Comment to this provision makes plain that liability is imposed with respect to a tortfeasor’s use
of either the defendant’s land or chattels with the defendant’s permission.21

While section

877(c) could potentially be applicable to patent infringement, it would more likely apply to the
infringement of copyrights or trademarks.22
D. Liability for Employees and Independent Contractors
Another source of liability for the torts of another may be found in the Restatement
(Second) of Agency. An employer is liable for torts that employees commit in the course of their

20

Id. § 877(c).

21

Id. Comment d.

22

Generally, a patent infringer will not commit infringing acts on another person’s
premises or with another person’s instrumentalities. In contrast, a vendor might rent a stall at a
flea market to sell merchandise that infringed copyrights or trademarks (see Fonovisa, Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996) (musical recordings); Hard Rock Cafe
Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992) (t-shirts)), or a
computer user might use the network of an internet service provider to infringe a copyright or
11

employment.23 In contrast, the general rule is that an employer is not liable for torts committed
by independent contractors.24 The justification for this distinction is that unlike an employer’s
power over an employee, an employer’s power over an independent contractor does not extend
to controlling the manner in which the independent contractor works, and therefore, the
independent contractor rather than the employer should bear responsibility for risks associated
with the independent contractor’s working for the employer.25

Numerous exceptions to the

general rule have developed, but they generally fall under one of the following categories: where
the harm was due to the employer’s negligence in selecting or supervising the independent
contractor, a non-delegable duty of the employer was involved, or the work was inherently
dangerous.26 None of these would appear to be generally applicable to the infringement of
patents, copyrights, or trademarks.27 Accordingly, it would seem that the general rule that an
trademark.
23

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (“A master is subject to
liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.”).
24

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1979) (“Except as stated in §§ 410429, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another
by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.”).
25

Id. Comment b.

26

Id.

27

In particular circumstances, an employer’s liability might be predicated on

negligence in selecting or supervising an independent contractor, but some sort of a duty of the
employer to the injured persons would have to be shown. See, e.g., id. §§ 412 (liability of one
who is under duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain land or chattels is liable for failure to
12

employer is subject to liability for the torts of employees, but not of independent contractors,
should apply to the infringement of intellectual property.28
This section has surveyed the general law of torts relating to the circumstances when a
defendant may be liable for torts committed by others. The remaining sections will examine the
law of indirect infringement of intellectual property and compare it to the general law of torts
described in this section.

III. Indirect Patent Infringement
A claim for the indirect infringement of a patent typically arises in the context of the sale
of a product that does not itself infringe, but which may be used by the purchaser to infringe the
patent.

In many cases, the product is a component of a patented device that consists of a

combination of elements, and the patent will not be infringed unless the product satisfies all the
elements of the patented combination. While the manufacture or sale of the component is not
infringing by itself, the component is susceptible to the purchaser’s combining it with other
components, thereby infringing the patent for the combination. Other cases may involve a

inspect contractor’s work), 414 (employer who owes duty to exercise reasonable care for safety
of others is liable if employer entrusts work to contractor for failure to exercise control).
Liability for indirect infringement could not be based on a non-delegable duty or an inherently
dangerous activity, however, because neither would apply to indirect infringement.
28

An employer might be liable for torts committed by an independent contractor,
though, under Restatement of Torts (Second) § 877(a) if the employer ordered or induced the
independent contractor to commit a tort or under other provisions in Restatement of Torts
(Second) §§ 876, 877 if the applicable requirements were satisfied.
13

patented process and the sale of a product that is susceptible to being used to infringe the patent
for the process, but the product does not infringe unless it is actually used to do so. If there are a
large number of purchasers and only one seller, it may not be feasible for the patentee to bring
multiple actions against the purchasers, but it may be feasible to bring a single patent
infringement action against the seller.
Indirect infringement in patent law originated in 1871 with the case of Wallace v.
Holmes.29

The patent was for a lamp consisting of a burner and a glass chimney that was

attached to the burner. The defendants manufactured and sold burners that were substantially the
same as the burners described in the patent, but the defendants did not directly infringe the
patent, because the defendants did not sell chimneys with the burners. Instead, the purchasers of
the burners directly infringed the patent when they attached chimneys that they purchased
separately to the defendants’ burners. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court held that the defendants
were liable for patent infringement because it found that the defendants acted in actual concert
with the makers of glass chimneys to cause the patent to be infringed.
burner and chimney were “each utterly useless without the other.”30

The court noted that a

While there was no direct

evidence that the defendants acted in actual concert with the makers of glass chimneys to
infringe the patent, the court concluded that their actual concert was a “certain inference from the
nature of the case, and the distinct efforts of the defendants to bring the burner into use, which

29

29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).

30

Id. at 80.
14

can only be done by adding the chimney.”31

The court explained that even though the

defendants may not have had an actual pre-arrangement with any particular person to supply the
chimney to be added to the burner, each sale of a burner was a proposal to the purchaser to
combine it with a chimney, and the purchase was a consent to the proposal.

Thus, the

defendants’ manufacture and sale of the burners made them active parties to the infringement.
The Wallace case relied on the defendant’s acting in concert as the basis for liability for
indirect patent infringement, and therefore, the Wallace case would fit within the rule in
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(a) for general tort law.32 Only a few years after the
Wallace case, an additional basis for indirect patent infringement began to be reflected in the
patent cases. In the 1878 case of Bowker v. Dows,33 the patent was for a fountain drink
containing an extract called saponine that increased the foam in the fountain drink.

The

defendant sold a saponine extract to buyers who intended to combine it with the other ingredients
to make the patented fountain drink. The court observed that the defendant’s manufacture and
sale of the saponine extract would not alone be sufficient for indirect infringement.
Nevertheless, the court imposed liability for indirect infringement because it found that the

31

Id.

32

Section 876(a) provides: “For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious
conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other
or pursuant to a common design with him, . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a)
(1979). The Comment to section 876(a) explains that parties act in concert “when they act in
accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to accomplish a
particular result,” and that the early common law based their liability on a mutual agency
between them. Id. Comment a.
33

3 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C.D. Mass. 1878).
15

defendant had advertised and sold the saponine extract for the purpose of inducing the purchasers
to use it to infringe the patent. The court explained:
The defendant sells an extract containing saponine to persons who intend
to use it in the combination claimed in the patent, and it is advertised and sold for
that very purpose. Such a sale we regard as an infringement of the patent, though
the manufacture and sale of the extract of saponine would not, without more, be
an infringement. Where the patent was for a combination of the burner and
chimney of a lamp, and the defendant made and sold the burner intending that it
should be used with the chimney, he was held by Judge Woodruff to be liable as
an infringer. Wallace v. Holmes [Case No. 17,100]. We do not think that the law
requires us to hold those persons who actually use the combination (most of them,
and perhaps all, without any purpose or knowledge of infringing), as the only
persons liable, to the exoneration of the only person who makes and sells the
extract for the express and avowed purpose of its use in the combination.34
While the Bowker court relied on the Wallace case, Bowker is analytically distinct from
Wallace. Liability in Wallace arose from the absence of any non-infringing uses for the burners
that the defendants manufactured and sold, and it was based on the defendants acting in concert
with the purchasers to infringe the patent.

In contrast, the saponine extract in Bowker

presumably had other uses (such as increasing foam in other fountain drinks) besides
infringement of the patent; otherwise, the defendant’s manufacture and sale of it would have
been sufficient for the imposition of liability. Liability in Bowker arose not merely from the
defendant’s manufacture and sale of the saponine extract, but from the defendant’s advertising
and selling the extract for the purpose of inducing the purchasers to infringe the patent.35
Referring to the general tort law principles in the prior section, the saponine manufacturer in

34

Id. at 1071.

35

Id.
16

Bowker would be liable as an aider or abettor under Restatement (Second) of Torts section
876(b), because it provided substantial assistance to the direct infringers by supplying them with
saponine, provided there was evidence that the manufacturer had actual knowledge of the patent
and that the buyers were infringing it.

Alternatively, the saponine manufacturer in Bowker

would be liable for inducing infringement under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(a)
through its advertising if it knew or should have known that the buyers would use the saponine to
infringe the patent.
Although the categories of indirect infringement in the Wallace and Bowker cases are
analytically distinct, subsequent cases consolidated them under the single heading of
contributory infringement with liability based on the defendant’s intent to assist another to
infringe.

For example, the Supreme Court approved the following statement in Henry v. A.B.

Dick Co.:36 “‘Contributory infringement . . . has been well defined as the intentional aiding of
one person by another in the unlawful making, or selling, or using of the patented invention.’”37
A defendant’s intent to assist another to infringe could either be inferred from the absence of
noninfringing uses for a product that the defendant sold38 or from evidence that the defendant

36

224 U.S. 1 (1912).

37

Id. at 33-34 (1912) (quoting from Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. R.
Specialty Co., 72 F. 1016, 1017 (C.C.D. Conn. 1896)), overruled on other grounds, Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 515 (1917).
38

Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 723-24 (6th Cir.
1897) (“But, where the article can only be used in a patented combination, the inference of the
intention of the maker and seller is certain, . . . .”). See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2777 (2005) (“In sum, where an article is ‘good for
nothing else’ but infringement, . . ., there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed
17

induced purchasers of the product to infringe through advertising or other means.39
This consolidated version of contributory infringement is similar to the liability for aiding
and abetting in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b),40 where a defendant substantially
assists or encourages another tortious conduct. Section 876(b) differs from the consolidated
version of contributory infringement, however, in that section 876(b) expressly requires the
defendant to have actual knowledge that the other person’s conduct is tortious, while the
consolidated version of contributory infringement required the defendant to intentionally aid the
other person in infringing the patent.
The development of the doctrine of contributory infringement had the beneficial effect of
providing redress to patentees against aiders and abettors of patent infringement. It also led to
abuse, however, as some patentees sought to extend their patent rights beyond the legitimate
scope of their patents to cover supplies and other staple materials that were used in their
inventions. The first means they used were tying arrangements with purchasers of their products
in which the patentees licensed their inventions in return for agreements that the purchasers
would purchase supplies for the inventions exclusively from the patentees. Instead of enforcing

availability, and there is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe, . . . .
(Citations omitted).)
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See Cugley v. Bundy Incubator Co., 93 F.2d 932, 935 (6th Cir. 1937) (sale of
product with instructions to infringe patented method); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v Precise
Mfg. Corp., 11 F.2d 209, 210 (2nd Cir. 1926) (advertising that product was designed for
infringing use and directions on cartons in which products were sold had instructions for
infringing use).
40

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself, . . . .”).
18

the tying arrangements directly against the purchasers, patentees often relied on the doctrine of
contributory infringement to enforce the tying arrangements against companies that provided
supplies and other staple materials that the purchasers used to infringe the patents.41 Congress
responded to this abuse with the Clayton Act,42 which prohibited tying arrangements.
Even after the Clayton Act, patentees attempted to use the doctrine of contributory
infringement against manufacturers of supplies that were used in their patented inventions. For
example, in Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp.,43 the plaintiff
was a manufacturer of dry ice that had a patent on a device that used dry ice, and the plaintiff
attempted to leverage its patent by asserting a claim for contributory infringement against a
competing manufacturer of dry ice.

The Supreme Court might have rejected the contributory

infringement claim on the grounds that there was no direct infringement by the purchasers of the
plaintiff’s device on account of their purchasing dry ice from the plaintiff’s competitors, because
the patent did not give the plaintiff the exclusive right to sell dry ice to purchasers of its device.44
Instead, the Supreme Court created the doctrine of patent misuse to prevent patentees from

41

See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1912), overruled, Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
42

15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000).

43

283 U.S. 27 (1931).

44

Cf. Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapper Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425,
433 (1894) (patent for toilet paper holder was not infringed by purchase of toilet paper used in
the patented toilet paper holder).
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enlarging their exclusive rights beyond the legitimate scope of their patents.45 In a series of
decisions, the Supreme Court rapidly expanded the doctrine of patent misuse until it finally
appeared to override the doctrine of contributory infringement.46 The patent bar reacted to these
Supreme Court decisions by going to Congress to secure the adoption of section 271 of title 35
of the United States Code in 1952.47
Section 271 codified both the doctrines of contributory infringement and patent misuse so
that they would no longer conflict with each other. It also subdivided the consolidated version of
contributory infringement into two categories of indirect infringement. Section 271(b) imposed
liability on “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent,”48 and it covered the
circumstances in the Bowker case where the defendant advertised and sold its product for the
express purpose that it would be used to infringe a patent. Section 271(c) imposed liability on
the seller of “a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the

45

See Carbice, 283 U.S. at 33-34; Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of
the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 526 (1953) (noting that the doctrine of
patent misuse was first pronounced in the Carbice case).
46

See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944): Rich, supra note 45, at
535 (describing the doctrine of contributory infringement as “completely submerged” by the
doctrine of patent misuse and “entirely dead as a basis of recovery” (emphasis in original)).
47

For additional discussion of the historical background of contributory
infringement and the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271, see 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS, § 17.02 [1]-[6] (2004); Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for
Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369 (2006); Rich, supra
note 45.
48

35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
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invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent.”49

Section 271(c) excluded from its scope the sale of “a staple

article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.”50 Thus, section
271(c) would cover the sale of the patented device in the Carbice case, but not the sale of dry
ice, which would be excluded because it is a “staple article or commodity of commerce,” rather
than a material part of the patented invention. By excluding the sale of staple articles from the
scope of contributory infringement, section 271(c) avoids the abuses of the doctrine of
contributory infringement that led to the development of the doctrine of patent misuse. Finally,
section 271(d) limits the scope of patent misuse by excluding circumstances where liability is
imposed under paragraphs (b) or (c).51
In terms of the provisions in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 271(b) is
analogous to the provision for inducing infringement in Restatement (Second) of Torts section
877(a), and section 271(c) is analogous to the provision for aider and abettor liability in
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b).

Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b)

differs from section 271(c), however, in that it provides for liability if the aider and abettor
“gives substantial assistance or encouragement” to the person committing the tort, while section
271(c) requires the sale of a component that is especially made or adapted for use in

49

Id. § 271(c).

50

Id.

51

Id. § 271(d).
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infringement of a patent and excludes the sale of a staple article that is suitable for substantial
noninfringing use.
It is difficult to conceive of a circumstance where the sale of a component with no
substantial noninfringing use would not substantially assist an infringer, and therefore, most of
the time, selling a component with no substantial use other than for infringement would
constitute “substantial assistance” to an infringer. On the other hand, an aider and abettor might
give substantial assistance to an infringer by providing a staple article, because the staple article
may be of substantial assistance for infringement, even though it also has substantial
noninfringing uses. Therefore, the standard for contributory infringement under section 271(c)
appears narrower than the standard for aider and abettor liability under Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 876(b).

Would it be possible to hold a defendant liable as an aider and abettor

under section 876(b) for selling a staple article if there was proof that the defendant had actual
knowledge that the buyer was using the staple article to infringe a patent? It would seem that the
history behind the enactment of section 271 would preclude such a result. The Senate Report
accompanying section 271 stated:
Considerable doubt and confusion as to the scope of contributory infringement
has resulted from a number of decisions of the courts in recent years. The
purpose of this section is to codify in statutory form principles of contributory
infringement and at the same time eliminate this doubt and confusion. . . .
[Section 271(c)] is much more restricted than many proponents of contributory
infringement believe should be in the case.52
It would be contrary to this legislative intent to extend liability for contributory infringement
beyond the scope of section 271(c) to cover sales of products with substantial noninfringing uses.

52

S. Rep. No. 82-1979 (1952), at 8, as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402.
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The Supreme Court addressed the mental state required for contributory infringement
under section 271(c) in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Replacement Co.53 The Aro case
involved a patent for automobile convertible tops, and it arose out of the defendant’s sale of
replacements for fabric portions of wornout convertible tops to automobile owners.

The

automobile owners were liable for direct infringement, because the automobile manufacturer
(Ford) had not obtained a license from the patentee for the convertible tops. By a 5-4 majority,
the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s liability for contributory infringement under section
271(c) depended on the defendant’s knowledge not only that the fabric replacements were
“especially made or especially adapted for use” in the convertible tops, but also that the use in
the convertible tops would be infringing.54

The Court held that the defendant not only must

have been aware of the patent but also it must have known that the automobile manufacturer was
not licensed under the patent at the time that the defendant sold the fabric replacements to the
automobile owners in order for the defendant’s sales to constitute contributory infringement.
This result is consistent with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b), which requires both that a
defendant gave substantial assistance or encouragement to another person and that the defendant
knew that the other person’s conduct constituted a breach of duty in order for the defendant to be
liable for harm to a third person resulting from the other person’s conduct.55

53

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964).

54

Id. at 488 (“[A] majority of the Court is of the view that § 271(c) does require a
showing that the alleged contributory infringer knew that the combination for which his
component was especially designed was both patented and infringing.”).
55

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
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While the defendant’s knowledge of infringement is required for liability for contributory
infringement under section 271(c), there is no requirement of an intent to cause infringement
under this provision.56 In contrast, there is an intent requirement for inducing infringement under
section 271(b). In a number of recent cases, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
acknowledged an apparent lack of clarity concerning the precise contours of this intent
requirement,57 and the issue has been discussed in several law review articles.58 The controversy
concerns “whether the required intent must be merely to induce the specific acts [constituting
infringement] or additionally to cause an infringement.”59
The apparent lack of clarity arises from two decisions of the Federal Circuit from 1990 –
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.60 and Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems,

56

Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (“Section 271(c) . . . made clear that only proof of a defendant's knowledge, not intent, that
his activity cause infringement was necessary to establish contributory infringement.”) (emphasis
in original) (Rich, J.); Rich, supra note 45, at 538 (“[Section 271(c) gives rise to liability without
any further proof of intent or inducement or joint action with the direct infringer.”).
57

See Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1364 n.4 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) and cases cited therein.
58

Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement,
22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 390-94 (2006); Timothy R. Holbrook, The
Intent Element of Indirect Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399
(2006); Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225 (2005);
Michael N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Intent to Infringe: Why the Federal Circuit Should
Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under § 271(b), 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 299 (2000);
Recent Cases, Patent Law–Active Inducement of Infringement–District Court Holds that
Inducement Liability Requires Proof of Intent to Induce Violation of the Law, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1246 (2002).
59

Insituform Techs. Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc. 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir.

60

909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

2004).
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Inc.61

In the Hewlett-Packard case, the patentee asserted claims for direct infringement and

inducing infringement against the owner of a division that its owner sold while the alleged
infringement was occurring. The patentee asserted the claim for direct infringement against the
owner of the division for the period before the sale and the claim for inducing infringement
against the former owner for the period after the sale. With respect to the direct infringement,
the owner admitted infringement but raised the defense of patent invalidity, and it denied liability
for inducing infringement. The trial court decided that the owner of the division was liable for
direct infringement before the sale, but the owner was not liable for inducing infringement after
the sale, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.
In an opinion by Judge Rich, the Federal Circuit held that “proof of actual intent to cause
the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active
inducement.”62

The Federal Circuit concluded that the owner was not liable for inducing

infringement, because there was no proof of this intent. Focusing on the owner’s motives, the
Federal Circuit decided that the owner was merely interested in selling the division for the
highest possible price, and the owner did care not whether the division continued to infringe the
patent after the sale or not. Because the Federal Circuit ruled that the owner did not intend to
induce the acts which constituted the infringement, it did not need to address whether there were
additional reasons that the defendant was not liable for inducing infringement. Had the court
done so, it might have decided that the owner was also not liable for inducing infringement

61

917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

62

Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469.
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because the owner believed the patent was invalid, as the owner had asserted in defending
against the direct infringement claim
The Manville case involved the personal liability of corporate officers for patent
infringement by their corporation based on their inducing infringement by the corporation.

In

reversing a judgment with respect to the officers’ liability for inducing infringement, the Federal
Circuit held: “The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged infringer's actions induced
infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would induce actual
infringements.”63 The Federal Circuit decided that the corporate officers were not liable for
inducing patent infringement by their corporation, because there was no basis for concluding that
they knew or should have known that their actions would induce actual infringements. The
officers had no way of knowing that their actions would induce infringement before the suit was
filed because they were not aware of the patent until after the suit was filed, and they were not
liable for inducing patent infringement after the suit was filed because of their good faith belief,
based on advice of counsel, that their corporation’s accused product did not infringe.
The difference between the standards in the Hewlett-Packard and Manville cases is the
second part of the Manville standard: that the defendant knew or should have known that the
defendant’s actions would induce actual infringements. The standards in Hewlett-Packard and
Manville are not really inconsistent, however, because the Hewlett-Packard case did not purport
to rule that the intent to induce the acts that constituted infringement was sufficient for inducing

63

Manville, 917 F.2d at 553 (emphasis in original).
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infringement.64 Instead, the Hewlett-Packard case held that this intent was only “a necessary
prerequisite” to inducing infringement.65
The Manville standard has two mental state components: a specific intent to induce the
acts constituting infringement and a mental state of knowledge that the conduct being induced
was infringing. The Manville standard closely tracks the provisions of Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 877(a),66 under which a defendant is subject to liability for inducing tortious
conduct of another if the defendant knows or should know of circumstances that would make the
conduct tortious if the conduct were the defendant’s own. In addition, the knowledge component
for inducing infringement in Manville is similar to the requirement that the Supreme Court
mandated for contributory infringement in Aro, except that the Supreme Court required the
defendant to have actual knowledge of the direct infringement in Aro,67 while the Manville case
allows liability to be based on either actual or constructive knowledge.
Even though there is no real inconsistency between the Hewlett-Packard and Manville

64

Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 2004 WL 350476, *4 (D.Conn.). The student
commentary in Recent Cases, supra note 58 at n.40, refers to the possibility that the HewlettPackard court may have intended the requirement of intent to induce the acts constituting
infringement to be only a necessary and not a sufficient prerequisite for liability. It then
dismissed this possibility with the statement: “Courts have not generally understood HewlettPackard and its progeny in this manner.” Id. The single case that the commentary cited for this
statement provides no support for this conclusion, however.
65

Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469 (“[P]roof of actual intent to cause the acts
which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.”).
66

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(a) (“For harm resulting to a third person
from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) orders or induces the
conduct, if he knows or should know of circumstances that would make the conduct tortious if it
were his own, . . . .”).
67

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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standards, several subsequent Federal Circuit cases have noted an apparent conflict between
them. The first case to do so was Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc.,68 where
the court stated that there was “lack of clarity concerning whether the required intent must be
merely to induce the specific acts or additionally to cause an infringement.”69

This statement

was followed by citations to the Manville and Hewlett-Packard cases with parenthetical
quotations from each of them, including the statement in Hewlett-Packard that an intent to cause
the acts constituting infringement was a “necessary prerequisite” to inducing infringement.
Although the Insituform decision quoted Hewlett-Packard correctly, the court appeared to
interpret the quoted statement as saying that an intent to cause the acts constituting infringement
was sufficient for liability for inducing infringement.70 The Federal Circuit continued that it was

68

385 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

69

Id. at 1378.

70

For similar misinterpretations of the language from Hewlett-Packard, see SEB,
S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 336, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“In contrast, the
court in Hewlett-Packard held that the plaintiff only needs to show that the alleged infringer had
an ‘actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement. . . .’”); Mark A. Lemley,
Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 238 (2005) (“The court said that
Bausch & Lomb could be liable for inducement so long as H-P could prove it ‘actual[ly]
inten[ded] to cause the acts which constitute the infringement.’ ”); Michael N. Rader, Toward a
Coherent Law of Intent to Infringe: Why the Federal Circuit Should Adopt the Hewlett-Packard
Standard for Intent Under § 271(b), 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 299, 320 (2000) (“[T]he standard
articulated . . . by the Hewlett-Packard court [was] that inducement requires only “actual intent
to cause the acts which constitute the infringement.’”); John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and
the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 219, 228-29 (1998) (“Recent decisions have variously required that the defendant
specifically knew or should have known his action would induce actual infringements, more
general ‘knowledge of an infringement controversy,’ or merely that the defendant possess ‘actual
intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement.’” (Footnotes omitted)).
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unnecessary to resolve any ambiguity in the case law, because there was sufficient evidence to
affirm the trial court’s finding of liability for inducing infringement under either standard. The
court then delineated the evidence that established both the defendant’s intent to induce the acts
constituting infringement and the defendant’s knowledge that the acts were infringing.
Similarly, in Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp.71 and Golden Blount, Inc. v.
Robert H. Peterson Co.,72 the Federal Circuit said that there was a lack of clarity with respect to
the intent required for inducing infringement, but then went on to affirm the trial courts’ finding
of liability after reviewing the evidence presented of the respective defendants’ intent to induce
the acts constituting infringement and their knowledge that the acts were infringing.73 Both the
Insituform and Fuji Photo opinions appeared to characterize the knowledge component in
Manville as an intent requirement, because they each referred to evidence of the defendants’
awareness of the patent and the charges of infringement as proof of the intent to induce
infringement, rather than as proof of the defendants’ knowledge of the infringing activities.74
The other two cases in which the Federal Circuit has referred to a lack of clarity with

71

394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

72

438 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

73

438 F.3d at 1364 n.4; 394 F.3d at 1377-78.

74

394 F.3d at 1378 (“This court has acknowledged the relevance of [evidence of the
plaintiff’s infringement contentions and the defendant’s twice seeking a license from the
plaintiff] supporting proof of intent for inducement.”); 385 F.3d at 1378 (“On [evidence of
knowledge of accusations of infringement], the court determined that the intent requirement was
met.”). For a similar characterization of the knowledge component of Manville as an intent
requirement, see Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Indirect Infringement, 22 SANTA
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respect to the intent required for inducing infringement were both concerned with whether the
defendant intended to induce the acts constituting infringement, rather than whether the
defendant had knowledge that the acts constituted patent infringement.

In Mercexchange,

L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.,75 the Federal Circuit found there was no evidence that the defendant
intended to induce the acts constituting infringement,76 and it therefore reversed the judgment
holding the defendant liable for inducing infringement. In MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp.,77 the Federal Circuit found that there were genuine issues of
material fact concerning whether the defendant intended to induce the acts constituting
infringement, and therefore, it reversed a summary judgment for the defendant.
Thus, although there is language repeated in several recent Federal Circuit opinions and
law review articles suggesting that the case law with respect to the intent required for inducing
infringement is in disarray, the Federal Circuit has managed to apply the holdings from HewlettPackard and Manville in a consistent manner.

To reiterate, the mental state that Hewlett-

Packard requires for liability for inducing infringement under section 271(b) is a specific intent
by the defendant to induce the direct infringer’s acts that constitute infringement,78 and Manville
requires in addition that the defendant knew or should have known that the direct infringer’s acts
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 404 (2006).
75

401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded on other grounds, eBay,
Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
76

Id. at 1332-33.

77

420 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

78

Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469.
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would be infringing.79

These requirements are substantially the same as those found in

Restatement of Torts (Second) section 877(a) for tort liability for inducing another’s tortious
conduct that results in harm to a third person. In contrast, the mental state required for liability
for contributory infringement under section 271(c) is the defendant’s knowledge that “the
combination for which his component was especially designed was both patented and
infringing.”80
The next section examines the mental states required for indirect liability for copyright
infringement and compares them to the general tort standards for indirect liability.

IV. Indirect Copyright Infringement
The contexts in which claims for indirect copyright infringement arise differ from the
contexts for indirect patent infringement. Typically, indirect patent infringement claims arise out
of the sale of a component of a product that is used by a purchaser to infringe a patent for the
product or the sale of a product that is used by a purchaser to infringe a patented method.81 In
contrast, indirect copyright infringement claims mostly arise in two other contexts.
In the first context, the defendant has control of premises where copyright infringement is

79

Manville, 917 F.2d at 553.

80

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964).

81

Other contexts in which indirect patent infringement claims have arisen have
included a defendant’s sale of a business that continued to infringe a patent after the sale, and
where a patentee sought to hold corporate officers personally liable for a corporation’s
infringement of a patent. See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 917 F.2d 544
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occurring and receives financial benefit from the copyright infringement. Liability is imposed
under the heading of vicarious copyright infringement, and it is based on an extension of the
agency principle of respondeat superior.82 In the second context, the defendant either materially
contributes to or induces copyright infringement by another person and the defendant knows of
the infringement.

Liability is imposed under the heading of contributory copyright

infringement, and the standard for it is similar to that set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts
sections 876(b)83 and 877(a).84
The doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement developed out of a series of dance hall
cases in which dance hall proprietors were held to be liable for copyright infringement by
orchestras that were performing at the dance halls. Liability was imposed on the dance hall
proprietors even though the orchestras were independent contractors, rather than employees of
the proprietors,85 the proprietors did not participate in the selection of the infringing music,86 and

(Fed. Cir. 1990); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
82

See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“The concept of vicarious copyright liability was developed in the Second Circuit as an
outgrowth of the agency principles of respondeat superior.”).
83

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself, . . . .”).
84

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(a) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) orders or induces
the conduct, if he knows or should know of circumstances that would make the conduct tortious
if it were his own, . . . .”).
85

Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th

Cir. 1929).
86

Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (“One who hires an
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the proprietors neither intended to infringe nor knew of the copyright infringement by the
orchestras.87

Summarizing these cases, the Second Circuit concluded in Shapiro, Bernstein &

Co. v. H.L. Green Co.88 that liability for vicarious copyright infringement could be predicated on
the defendant’s right and ability to supervise the infringing activity together with the defendant’s
direct financial interest in the exploitation of the copyrighted materials. The policy for imposing
liability when these conditions were satisfied was that placing responsibility on the defendant
would encourage the defendant to police the conduct of the infringer and thereby promote
enforcement of the copyright law.89 In upholding a finding of vicarious copyright infringement
in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.,90 the Second Circuit
summarized the holding in the Shapiro case as follows: “[E]ven in the absence of an employeremployee relationship one may be vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise

orchestra for a public performance for profit is not relieved from a charge of infringement merely
because he does not select the particular program to be played.”).
87

See Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co., 58 F. Supp. 523, 533 (D. Neb.
1944) (“Neither formal intent by the proprietor to infringe, nor his knowledge of the program
actually rendered is required.”), aff’d, 157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1946); Buck v. Pettijohn, 34 F.
Supp. 968, 968 (E.D. Tenn. 1940) (“The defendant is liable in damages for the wrongful act of
the orchestra, although he may not have authorized or knew that this composition was played, for
the reason that he received benefits to his business by this orchestral performance.); Buck v.
Russo, 25 F. Supp. 317, 321 (D. Mass. 1938) (“It is settled that knowledge of the particular
selections to be played is immaterial and intention to infringe was unnecessary.”).
88

316 F.2d 304 (2nd Cir. 1963).

89

Id. at 308. See also Polygram Int’l Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F.
Supp. 1314, 1324-26 (D. Mass. 1994) (discussing policy for vicarious liability for copyright
infringement).
90

443 F.2d 1159 (2nd Cir. 1971).
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the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.”91
The Ninth Circuit followed Shapiro in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.92

The

court held that a complaint stated a claim for vicarious copyright infringement against the
operators of a swap meet on account of the sale of counterfeit copyrighted recordings by vendors
at the swap meet.

In addition, in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,93 the Ninth Circuit

affirmed a decision that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success with respect to a
vicarious copyright infringement claim. In other cases, courts have found that the elements of
vicarious copyright infringement had not been satisfied94 or else have noted the existence of the
theory of vicarious copyright but decided that it was unnecessary to address it.95

91

Id. at 1162.

92

76 F.3d 259, 261-63 (9th Cir. 1996)

93

239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001).

94

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437-38
(1984) (“This case . . . plainly does not fall into [the vicarious copyright infringement]
category.”); Ellison v. Robertson, 375 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2004) (no showing that the
defendant received a direct financial benefit from the copyright infringement); Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Committee. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding
no basis for vicarious copyright infringement claim); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp.
289, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
95

See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2776 n.9
(2005) (finding no need to analyze the vicarious copyright infringement theory because the Court
resolved the case on an inducement theory); In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2003)
(whether defendant was a vicarious copyright infringer was academic because of the likelihood
that defendant was liable for contributory copyright infringer). See also Polygram Int’l
Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1324-26 (D. Mass. 1994) (court found
that evidence was not sufficient to find direct infringement but it went on to find vicarious
copyright infringement in order to create a full record for appellate review).
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The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement originated in Kalem Co. v. Harper
Brothers,96 where the Supreme Court grounded the doctrine “on principles recognized in every
part of the law.”97 The defendant produced a film version of the novel, Ben Hur, and then
advertised and sold films to jobbers who infringed the plaintiff’s copyright by publicly
displaying the films. Holding that the defendant was liable for contributory infringement of the
copyright, Justice Holmes explained:
The defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its films
for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most conspicuous purpose
for which they could be used, and the one for which especially they were made. If
the defendant did not contribute to the infringement, it is impossible to do so
except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on principles recognized in every
part of the law.98
In a subsequent case, Justice Cardozo described the controlling principle from Kalem as follows:
“One who sells a film with the intention that the buyer shall use it in the infringement of a
copyrighted drama is himself liable as an infringer.”99
Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.100 involved a claim against
an advertising agency and a broadcasting company that ran ads for hit records at suspiciously

96

222 U.S. 55 (1911).

97

Id. at 63.

98

Id. at 62-63.

99

Underhill v. Shenck, 143 N.E. 773, 776 (N.Y. 1924).

100

256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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low prices. In denying in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court
emphasized the common law origins of contributory copyright infringement. The court held:
Since infringement constitutes a tort, common law concepts of tort liability are
relevant in fixing the scope of the statutory copyright remedy, and the basic
common law doctrine that one who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortious
act is jointly and severally liable with the prime tort-feasor is applicable in suits
arising under the Copyright Act.101
Approving the Screen Gems case, the Second Circuit phrased the standard for
contributory copyright infringement in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management, Inc.,102 as follows: “[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
‘contributory’ infringer.”103 The Ninth Circuit has characterized the quoted language from
Gershwin as the classic statement of the doctrine of contributory copyright infringement,104 and
numerous cases have quoted this language with approval.105
While the language from Gershwin quoted above appears to require a contributory
infringer to have actual knowledge of the direct infringement, the Gershwin court muddied the

101

Id. at 403.

102

443 F.2d 1159 (2nd Cir. 1971).

103

Id. at 1162.

104

Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).

105

E.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004); Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th Cir. 1990); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Committee. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995);
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waters by presenting the Screen Gems case as an example of contributory copyright infringement
and stating that the Screen Gems court had ruled that the defendants could be liable for
contributory copyright infringement upon a showing that they “had knowledge, or reason to
know” of the infringement.106 As a result of the Gershwin court’s aside with respect to the
Screen Gems case, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have decided that constructive knowledge of
direct infringement is sufficient for liability for contributory infringement.107
The Supreme Court examined the scope of contributory copyright infringement in Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.108 This case concerned whether Sony was liable for
contributory infringement on account of Sony’s sale of video tape recorders to consumers who
used them to infringe the plaintiffs’ copyrights. The Supreme Court began its analysis by
eliminating a number of possible grounds for imposing liability on Sony. The Court first
observed that liability could not be imposed on Sony under Kalem, because the defendant in
Kalem sold the infringing work itself to the direct infringer, while Sony supplied a piece of
equipment that was not itself infringing but instead had both infringing and noninfringing

Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
106

See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162. See also Screen Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 405
(evidence was sufficient to show that radio stations had either actual or constructive knowledge
of direct infringement).
107

Ellison v. Robertson, 375 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We have interpreted
the knowledge requirement for contributory copyright infringement to include both those with
actual knowledge and those who have reason to know of direct infringement.”) (emphasis in
original); Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 364 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The standard of knowledge is
objective: ‘Know, or have reason to know.’”). For a discussion of the knowledge requirement
for contributory copyright infringement, see Sverker K. Högberg, Note, The Search for IntentBased Doctrines of Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909 (2006).
108

464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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uses.109

The Court next stated that liability could not be imposed for vicarious copyright

infringement, because Sony had no control over the consumers or their uses of the video tape
recorders.110

The Court also ruled that Sony did not intentionally induce its customers to

infringe the plaintiffs’ copyrights.111 In addition, the Court ruled that Sony did not supply its
equipment to persons that it knew were engaging in continuing infringement of the copyrights.112
After eliminating all these possible grounds for liability, the Court then framed the issue
before it as whether liability113 should be imposed because of Sony’s sale of “equipment with
constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.”114 Noting that there was no precedent in copyright

109

Id. at 436-37.

110

Id. at 437-38.

111

Id. at 439, n. 19.

112

Id.

113

While the Court referred to the imposition of “vicarious liability,” it is evident
that it was using this term in a general sense, rather than to refer to vicarious copyright
infringement as exemplified by the dance hall cases. The Court had already eliminated
vicarious copyright infringement as a basis for Sony’s liability. In addition, there is no
requirement of either constructive or general knowledge for vicarious copyright infringement.
See also Högberg, supra note 107, at 921 n.92 (“Although the Court referred to ‘vicarious
liability,’ this term seems to be a synonym for secondary liability in general.”).
114

464 U.S. at 439. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 125 S. Ct.
2764, 2777 (2005), the Court characterized the issue before it in Sony as whether liability should
have been imposed “of a theory of contributory infringement arising from its sale of VCRs to
consumers with knowledge that some would use them to infringe.” The issue framed in Sony,
however, was actually whether liability should be imposed on account of Sony’s constructive
38

law for imposing liability on this ground, the Court then looked to patent law for an analogy in
order to resolve the issue of Sony’s liability for contributory infringement. Turning to the staple
article of commerce doctrine from patent law in section 271(c) of Title 35,115 the Court decided
that it struck an appropriate balance between the rights of copyright holders and the rights of
others to manufacture products. It therefore held that the sale of copying equipment would not
constitute contributory copyright infringement if the equipment was either widely used for
noninfringing purposes or was capable of substantial noninfringing uses.116 Finding that the
video tape recorders had substantial noninfringing uses, the Court concluded that Sony’s sales
did not constitute contributory infringement.117
Instead of looking to the patent statute for an analogy, the Sony Court should have relied
on the general principles of vicarious liability that it had referenced earlier in the opinion.118 The
patent statute was enacted in 1952 to rescue the doctrine of contributory infringement from being
severely undermined by the doctrine of patent misuse as a result of a line of Supreme Court
patent opinions in which the Court had ruled that a patentee’s assertion of contributory

knowledge of direct infringement, rather than Sony’s actual knowledge that some of its
customers would engage in direct infringement.
115

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.

116

Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.

117

Id. at 456 (“The Betamax is, therefore, capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
Sony's sale of such equipment to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement
of respondent's copyrights.”).
118

Id. at 455 (“For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law . . .

.”).
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infringement constituted patent misuse.119

This line of Supreme Court opinions had no

connection with copyright law, and there is no evidence of any legislative intent for applying the
patent statute to copyright law. The only explanation the Court gave for referring to patent law
was what it called “the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.”120 The kinship
between the law of indirect copyright infringement and general tort law principles was closer
than with patent law, however, because the law of indirect infringement of copyright derived
from general tort law principles. Accordingly, these principles should have been controlling in
Sony. Had the Court relied on general tort law instead of the patent statute, it would have
reached the same result, because it ultimately concluded that there was no contributory
infringement under either the general tort law or the patent statute.
It is important to recognize the limits of the Sony decision. Certainly Sony’s actual
knowledge of copyright infringement by its customers could have been inferred if the equipment
it sold was not capable of any substantial noninfringing uses.

Actual knowledge could not

necessarily be inferred, however, if the equipment did have any substantial noninfringing uses.
Because it decided that the equipment did have substantial noninfringing uses, the Court was
unwilling to impose liability on Sony, in the absence of any proof that Sony either was in a
position to control copyright infringement by its customers,121 intentionally induced copyright

119

See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.

120

Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.

121

Id. at 437-38.
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infringement by its customers,122 or supplied its equipment to customers with actual knowledge
that they were engaging in copyright infringement.123
The Court addressed inducing infringement in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster.124 In Grokster, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision that the defendants
could not be liable for contributory copyright infringement on account of their distribution of
products that were capable of substantial noninfringing uses, unless the defendants had actual
knowledge of specific instances of infringement and failed to act on that knowledge. The Court
decided that Sony’s limitation on liability for contributory copyright infringement arising from
the sale of products with substantial noninfringing uses did not preclude liability of inducing
infringement.125

Again turning to patent law for an analogy,126 the Court held: “[O]ne who

distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts
of infringement by third parties.”127 The Court continued:

122

Id. at 439, n. 19.

123

Id.

124

125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).

125

Id. at 2779.

126

Id. at 2780 (“For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of
patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible
one for copyright.”).
127

Id.
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[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be
enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident
to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product
updates, support liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct . . . .128
The Court also explained:
It is not only that encouraging a particular consumer to infringe a copyright can
give rise to secondary liability for the infringement that results. Inducement
liability goes beyond that, and the distribution of a product can itself give rise to
liability where evidence shows that the distributor intended and encouraged the
product to be used to infringe. In such a case, the culpable act is not merely the
encouragement of infringement but also the distribution of the tool intended for
infringing use.129
The Court then reviewed the evidence in the summary judgment record and decided that it
showed that the defendants’ unlawful objective was unmistakable and that there was substantial
evidence of all the elements required for inducing infringement.
The case law on contributory copyright infringement and inducing infringement
described above has a great deal of similarity to the general tort law principles of aiding and
abetting liability and inducing tortious conduct found in Restatement (Second) of Torts sections
876(b)130 and 877(a).131

The Gershwin court blurred the distinction between aiding and
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Id.

129

Id. at 2782, n.13.

130

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself, . . . .”).
131

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(a) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) orders or induces
42

abetting liability and inducing tortious conduct, but the Supreme Court appeared to recognize a
distinction between these two grounds for liability in both the Sony132 and Grokster133 cases.
The Supreme Court has not addressed, however, whether actual or constructive knowledge is
required for either contributory copyright infringement or inducing infringement.

While the

Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have ruled that constructive knowledge is sufficient, these courts did
not distinguish between contributory copyright infringement or inducing infringement. Under
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b), actual knowledge should be required for
contributory infringement, and under section 877(a), constructive knowledge should be sufficient
for inducing infringement.
The Supreme Court has also not addressed whether the limitation from Sony on liability
for contributory copyright infringement arising from the sale of a product having no substantial
noninfringing uses should apply where the seller has actual knowledge that particular customers
are using the product for infringement. As noted previously,134 this limitation should apply in
patent law because of the legislative intent to restrict liability for contributory patent
infringement to the sale of products with no substantial noninfringing uses.

It is less clear

whether this limitation should apply in copyright law, however, because of the absence of any
legislative intent with respect to copyright law. Moreover, the Court declared in Grokster that
the conduct, if he knows or should know of circumstances that would make the conduct tortious
if it were his own, . . . .”).
132

See Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19 (finding that Sony neither intentionally induced
infringement nor supplied products to individuals that it knew were continuing infringement).
133

See Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2782 n.19 (noting that inducing infringement goes
beyond encouraging a particular consumer to infringe a copyright).
134

See supra text accompanying note 52.
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“the [Sony] case was never meant to foreclose fault-based liability derived from the common
law.”135

Thus, it may be that liability for contributory copyright infringement should be

imposed on a seller of products having substantial noninfringing uses under the common law
aider and abettor principles in section 876(b). For liability to be imposed, there would have to be
evidence of the seller’s providing substantial assistance to buyers to infringe copyrights as well
as the seller’s actual knowledge that the buyers were using the products to infringe the
copyrights.
While the general tort law supports imposition of liability for contributory copyright
infringement and inducing infringement, it does not appear to support liability for vicarious
copyright infringement, and this suggests that the doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement
should be reexamined. Restatement (Second) of Agency section 219136 provides that employers
are liable for the torts of their employees committed in the course of their employment, but
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 409137 provides that employers are generally not liable for
torts committed by independent contractors. The common law’s distinction between employees
and independent contractors is made on account of the difference in employers’ power to control
the manner in which work is done by employees and independent contractors. Liability for
vicarious copyright infringement arises out of the defendant’s control over the direct infringer

135

Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2779.

136

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (“A master is subject to
liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.”).
137

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1979) (“Except as stated in §§ 410429, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another
by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.”).
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and its direct financial interest in the infringing activities.138 It would seem that if a defendant
truly exercises control over a direct infringer’s activities, it should be treated as an employer and
liable under Restatement (Second) of Agency section 219. But if the defendant’s degree of
control is not sufficient for the defendant to be liable as an employer, it should not be liable for
vicarious copyright infringement when it would not be subject to liability for other torts that the
direct infringer may commit.139
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(c)140 provides an alternative ground that might
have been used in some cases for imposing liability on dance hall proprietors for copyright
infringement by orchestras they hired. Section 877(c) provides for liability if a defendant
permits another person to use the defendant’s premises or instrumentalities, but it includes a
requirement that the defendant must have actual or constructive knowledge that the other person
is acting or will act tortiously.

Treating dance hall proprietors like landlords, rather than

138

Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2nd Cir. 1971) (“[E]ven in the absence of an employer-employee relationship one may be
vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a
direct financial interest in such activities.”).
139

Cf. Sony, 464 U.S. at 488 n. 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Courts have premised
liability in these cases on the notion that the defendant had the ability to supervise or control the
infringing activities, [citations omitted]. This notion, however, is to some extent fictional; the
defendant cannot escape liability by instructing the performers not to play copyrighted music, or
even by inserting a provision to that effect into the performers' contract.”).
140

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (c) permits the
other to act upon his premises or with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to know
that the other is acting or will act tortiously, . . . .”). Id. § 877(d) provides for liability if a
defendant “controls, or has a duty to use care to control, the conduct of the other, who is likely to
do harm if not controlled, and fails to exercise care in the control. . . .” The Comment to this
provision indicates that it is directed to cases involving insane or dangerous persons;
accordingly, it would not be applicable to indirect infringement.
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employers, would not have precluded their being liable for copyright infringement by the
orchestras, but it would have limited their liability to circumstances where they had actual or
constructive knowledge of the copyright infringement.
The doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement has begun to metastasize from its
origins in the dance hall cases to cases involving computer networks.141 As a consequence,
Congress has enacted safe harbor provisions in section 512 of title 17 in order to protect Internet
service providers and others from open-ended liability on account of copyright infringement by
users of their networks.142 For example, section 512(c) exempts an Internet service provider
from liability for copyright infringement arising out of the storage of material on the service
provider’s system if the service provider lacks actual or constructive knowledge of copyright
infringement or acts expeditiously to remove the material after obtaining knowledge of the

141

See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir.
2001); Ellison v. Robertson, 375 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Aimster, 334 F.3d
643, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 856-58 (C.D. Cal.
2006); Marobie-Fl, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire & Equip. Distribs., 983 F.Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Committee. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375-76
(N.D. Cal. 1995); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1367 (2004) (“In recent years, the
doctrine has far outgrown the employment and independent contracting contexts, and the
financial interest that a defendant must have in a third party's infringing activities in order to be
held liable has become more attenuated.”); Comment, Kelly Tickle, The Vicarious Liability of
Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their Bulletin
Boards, 80 IOWA L. REV. 391 (1995); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for
Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J.
1833, 1843-80 (2000).
142

See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 20 (1988); Lemley & Reese, supra note 129, at 1369;
Jason Kessler, Note, Correcting the Standard for Contributory Trademark Liability Over the
Internet, COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 375, 396-97 (2006).
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copyright infringement.143 Unfortunately, this provision may not be completely effective in
protecting operators of computer networks who lack actual or constructive knowledge of
infringing activity from liability for vicarious copyright infringement.144
Instead of allowing the anomalous doctrine of vicarous copyright infringement to expand
beyond its origins in the dance hall cases and then rely on section 512 to protect computer
network operators from liability for it, courts should restrict the doctrine of vicarious copyright
infringement to dance hall cases (and in the Ninth Circuit, to swap meets 145 and Napster146). In
place of vicarious copyright infringement, courts should use the general tort law principles in
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(c) and impose liability on computer network operators
on account of copyright infringement by users of their networks only if the computer network
operators have either actual or constructive knowledge of the copyright infringement.147
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17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000).

144

Section 512(c) applies only to liability arising from the storage of infringing
material on a computer network, and some network owners may become liable for vicarious
copyright infringement on account of the transmission of infringing material. See Lemley &
Reese, supra note 141, at 1369-71. In addition, section 512 (c) provides that the safe harbor does
not apply if the service provider receives a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity. See Kessler, supra note 142, at 396-97. But see Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.
Supp. 2d 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (eBay came within safe harbor provision in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)).
145

Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (claim
for vicarious copyright infringement stated against operator of a swap meet).
146

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001)
(likelihood of success shown for vicarious copyright infringement claim against Napster).
147

See Yen, supra note 141, at 1892 (“Whatever the wrongs embodied in copyright
infringement, they are not serious enough to warrant ISP liability unless knowing assistance in
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V. Indirect Trademark Infringement
Until recently, claims for indirect infringement of trademarks typically arose in the
context of the sale of unlabeled products to retailers who affixed counterfeit trademarks on the
products before selling them to consumers. Liability has been imposed under the heading of
contributory trademark infringement, and the standard for contributory trademark infringement is
similar to that set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 876(b)148 and 877(a).149
The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement appears to have originated in
Societe Anonyme de la Distillerie de la Liquer Benedictine de L’Abbaye de Fecamp v. Western
Distilling Co.,150 and Hostetter Co. v. Brueggeman-Reinert Distilling Co.151 After the defendant
in Societe Anonyme was enjoined from selling Bendectine liquor in bottles that violated the
plaintiff’s trademark, the defendant sold its stock of Benedictine liquor in bulk to a third party
along with its bottles, labels and wrappers and notified its customers that the third party would be
filling their orders in the future. The court found the defendant guilty of contempt holding: “A
party who, while resting under an injunction restraining him from doing a given act, counsels,
that infringement is present.”).
148

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself, . . . .”).
149

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(a) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) orders or induces
the conduct, if he knows or should know of circumstances that would make the conduct tortious
if it were his own, . . . .”).
150

42 F. 96 (CC.E.D. Mo. 1891).

151

46 F. 188 (CC.E.D. Mo. 1891).
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advises, and procures another to do the act, violates the letter as well as the spirit of the
restraining order.”152
In Hostetter, the defendant sold a counterfeit bitters drink that resembled the plaintiff’s
trademarked Hostetter’s Bitters in bulk to the defendant’s customers and advised the customers
to refill bottles that originally contained Hostetter’s Bitters with the defendant’s counterfeit
bitters drink and then put them on the market as genuine Hostetter’s Bitters.153

Normally, a

claim for trademark infringement requires proof of the likelihood of confusion from the use of a
trademark in commerce.154 The defendant’s customers were aware that the defendant was the
source of the counterfeit bitters drink, and so there was no likelihood that the defendant’s
customers were confused by the sale. Relying on Societe Anonyme, however, the Hostetter court
issued an injunction holding: “[A] person who counsels and advises another to perpetrate a
fraud, and who also furnishes him the means of consummating the same, is himself a wrongdoer, and, as such, is liable for the injury inflicted.”155
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Societe Anonyme, 42 F. at 97.

153

For a brief history of Hostetter’s Bitters and the drink’s distinctive bottles, see
Frank Baxter, A Century of Hostetter’s Bitters or . . . It Pays to Advertise,
http://www.fohbc.com/images/hostetters.pdf.
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See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a) (registered marks) (2000). See also id. §1125(a)(1)
(false designations of origin).
155

Hostetter, 46 F. at 189. See also Coca Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 F. 720, 72223 (6th Cir. 1912) (“[I]n a suit for unfair competition, it is not necessary to show that the
immediate purchasers were deceived as to the origin of the goods; but even if they thoroughly
understand that they are buying the counterfeit, and not the genuine, the manufacturer of the
counterfeit will be enjoined from selling it to dealers with the purpose and expectation that it
shall be used by the dealers to deceive the consumer.”); Enoch Mogan’s Sons Co. v. WhittierCoburn Co., 118 F. 657, 662 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1902) (“We have, then, the case of a manufacturer
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William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co.156 involved a similar scenario. The plaintiff
manufactured a pharmaceutical preparation under the name Coco-Quinine, and the defendant
manufactured a substantially similar preparation which it sold to druggists under the name of
Quin-Coco at lower prices than the plaintiff’s preparation. The druggists in turn substituted the
defendant’s Quin-Coco for the plaintiff’s Coco-Quinine in dispensing it to consumers. The
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had established a claim for unfair competition:
That no deception was practiced on the retail dealers, and that they knew exactly
what they were getting, is of no consequence. The wrong was in designedly
enabling the dealers to palm off the preparation as that of the respondent.
[Citations omitted]. One who induces another to commit a fraud and furnishes the
means of consummating it is equally guilty and liable for the injury.157
The Restatement of Torts had three sections dealing with contributory trademark
infringement. Section 713 was entitled “Inducing Fraudulent Marketing,” and its black letter
provided: “One fraudulently markets his goods as those of another if, though making no

who is careful always to sell its goods as its own, but who puts them up in a style of package so
similar to that used by one of its competitors, earlier in the market, that unscrupulous dealers,
who purchase from the manufacturer in order to sell at retail to consumers, are enabled to delude
a large number of such retail purchasers by palming off upon them the goods of the manufacturer
as those of its competitor. That this is unfair competition seems apparent, both on reason and
authority.”); N. K. Fairbank Co. v. R. W. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 F. 869, 878 (2nd Cir. 1896) (“It has
been said more than once in this case that the manufacturer ought not to be held liable for the
fraud of the ultimate seller; that is, the shopkeeper or the shopkeeper's assistant. But that is not
the true view of the case. The question is whether the defendants have or have not knowingly
put into the hands of the retail dealers the means of deceiving the ultimate purchasers.”), quoting
from Lever v. Goodwin, 36 L.R. 1, 3 (Ch. Div. 1997)).
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265 U.S. 526 (1924).

157

Id. at 530-31.
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misrepresentation himself, he intentionally induces his purchasers so to market them.”158 The
Illustration for this section was based on the facts in the William R. Warner case.159 Section 738
was entitled “Inducing or Aiding One’s Purchasers to Infringe on Resale,” and its black letter
provided: “One who induces or aids persons who purchase goods directly or indirectly from him
to market them in such a manner as to infringe another's trade-mark or trade name infringes it
himself.”160 Lastly, section 739 was entitled “Contributory Infringement,” and its black letter
provided: “One who supplies third persons with labels, stamps, wrappers or containers bearing
designations identical with or confusingly similar to another's trade-mark or trade name is
subject to liability under the same conditions as the third persons who use the labels, stamps,
wrappers or containers.”161
The Chapter entitled “Confusion of Source” in which these sections were included was
omitted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts along with two other Chapters dealing with
unfair trade practices.

The American Law Institute decided that while the rules relating to

liability for harm from unfair trade practices had developed from torts law principles, the
influences of tort law had decreased in the fields of unfair competition and trade regulation, and

158

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 713 (1938)

159

See id. Illustration.

160

Id. § 738.

161

Id. § 739.
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therefore these fields no longer belonged in the Restatement of Torts.162 The Institute indicated
that if it was decided later than a restatement was needed for these fields, separate restatements
on the particular subjects would be prepared.163
The next major development in the law of contributory trademark infringement was the
Supreme Court’s decision in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.164 The plaintiff
manufactured and sold a patent prescription drug in colored capsules under a registered
trademark. After the patent expired, the generic drug manufacturers began manufacturing and
selling the drug in capsules that copied the appearance of plaintiff’s capsules. The plaintiff
alleged that some pharmacists had dispensed generic drugs that they had mislabeled with the
plaintiff’s registered trademark, and that the generic drug manufacturers had contributed to the
mislabeling by their use of look-alike capsules. The trial court ruled that the plaintiff had not
presented sufficient evidence to establish a claim for contributory trademark infringement, and
the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held:
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorially [sic] responsible for any harm done as a result of the
deceit.165
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Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition section 27166 sets out the standard for
contributory trademark infringement by manufacturers and distributors as follows:
One who markets goods or services to a third person who further markets
the goods or services in a manner that subjects the third person to liability to
another for infringement under the rule stated in § 20 is subject to liability to that
other for contributory infringement if:
(a) the actor intentionally induces the third person to engage in the
infringing conduct; or
(b) the actor fails to take reasonable precautions against the
occurrence of the third person's infringing conduct in circumstances in
which the infringing conduct can be reasonably anticipated.167
This provision is similar to the standard from Inwood, but it differs from Inwood in one respect.
Under Inwood, liability is imposed if a manufacturer or distributor continues to supply goods
with actual or constructive knowledge that the purchaser is engaging in trademark infringement.
In contrast, section 27 provides that a manufacturer or distributor may avoid liability by taking
reasonable precautions against the purchaser’s trademark infringement if the purchaser’s
trademark infringement could be reasonably anticipated. The Reporter’s Note explains that a
manufacturer would not be required to stop supplying goods to a particular purchaser who had
engaged in trademark infringement if the manufacturer reasonably believed that less drastic
precautions would deter future infringement.168
In addition, Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition section 26 provides for
contributory trademark infringement by printers, publishers and other suppliers as follows:
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 (1995).
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(1) One who, on behalf of a third person, reproduces or imitates the
trademark, trade name, collective mark, or certification mark of another on goods,
labels, packaging, advertisements, or other materials that are used by the third
person in a manner that subjects the third person to liability to the other for
infringement under the rule stated in § 20 is subject to liability to that other for
contributory infringement.
(2) If an actor subject to contributory liability under the rule stated in
Subsection (1) acted without knowledge that the reproduction or imitation was
intended by the third person to confuse or deceive, the actor is subject only to
appropriate injunctive relief.169
The Seventh Circuit analyzed contributory trademark infringement by an owner and
operator of flea markets in Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc.170 The
appellate court referred to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(c),171 which imposes tort
liability for permitting another person to act upon the defendant’s premises or with the
defendant’s instrumentalities with actual or constructive knowledge that the other person is
acting or will act tortiously. The court noted that section 877(c) imposed the same duty on
landlords and licensors as the Supreme Court had imposed on manufacturers and distributors in
Inwood. Accordingly, the court held that the Inwood standard applied to contributory trademark
infringement by the owner and operator of flea markets, and that the defendant must have actual
or constructive knowledge of trademark infringement by vendors at its flea markets for the
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955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (c) permits the
other to act upon his premises or with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to know
that the other is acting or will act tortiously, . . . .”).
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defendant to be liable for contributory trademark infringement.172 The court rejected application
of the doctrine of vicarious liability that had developed for contributory copyright infringement
out of the dance hall cases. The court noted that the Supreme Court had stated in Sony that there
were fundamental differences between copyright and trademark law and that the standard for
contributory infringement in trademark law was narrower than for copyright law.173
The Ninth Circuit approved Hard Rock in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,174
which involved contributory trademark infringement by an operator of a swap meet. The
Fonovisa court cited to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(c), and it applied the Inwood
standard to the swap meet.175
The Ninth Circuit took a strange turn, however, in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network
Solutions, Inc.176 The Lockheed case was brought against Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”), the
registrar of Internet domain names, for contributory trademark infringement on account of NSI’s
registering domain names to third parties that infringed or diluted Lockheed’s service mark for
“Skunk Works.” The court distinguished Inwood on the grounds that Inwood dealt with a
product being supplied by its manufacturer, while the court ruled that NSI supplied a service that
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was akin to the routing of mail by the United States Postal Service.177 The court then turned to
the Hard Rock and Fonovisa decisions for precedential guidance, and it stated that these
decisions taught that in cases involving contributory infringement outside the Inwood context of
manufacturers supplying products, courts should “consider the extent of control exercised by the
defendant over the third party's means of infringement.”178 The court explained: “Direct control
and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff's mark permits
the expansion of Inwood Lab.'s ‘supplies a product’ requirement for contributory
infringement.”179 The court then went on to affirm the summary judgment in favor of NSI on the
grounds that NSI did not exercise sufficient direct control and monitoring to warrant an
extension of Inwood to the supplier of a service.
The Lockheed decision’s interpretation of the Hard Rock and Fonovisa cases is
incorrect.180 Both cases expressly relied on Inwood and the provision in Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 877(c) that imposes tort liability for permitting another person to act upon the
defendant’s premises or with the defendant’s instrumentalities with actual or constructive
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have been considered by the court in Lockheed.”).
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knowledge that the other person is acting or will act tortiously.181 Neither Inwood nor section
877(c) requires direct control and monitoring for liability for contributory trademark
infringement. In addition, the Hard Rock case rejected application of the vicarious liability
doctrine from copyright law with its control requirement.182 Lockheed’s introduction of a control
requirement adds confusion to the analysis of contributory infringement, particularly for
computer network operators, because it is not clear what degree of control is required. In
addition, the degree of control with respect to computer networks is generally technology
dependent and so a control standard may require a complicated analysis of the underlying
technology. Furthermore, a control requirement provides an incentive for a computer network
operator to limit its monitoring and control of the network to avoid exposure to liability. Finally,
a control requirement directs attention away from the defendant’s intent and knowledge which
generally have been critical for a defendant’s liability for a tort committed by another.
Although the Lockheed decision was not supported by precedent and appears unwise, it has been
followed in several district court opinions.183
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Habeeba’s Dance of the Arts, Ltd. v. Knoblauch, ___ F. Supp. 2d ____, 2006 WL
120971, * 3-4 (S.D. Ohio) (complaint stated claim for contributory trademark infringement
against YMCA because facts alleged in complaint supported inference that YMCA had enough
control over direct infringer to have prevented infringement); SB Designs v. Reebok Int’l , Ltd.
338 F. Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (granting summary judgment on contributory trademark
infringement claim because there was no evidence that defendant controlled or monitored
website that allegedly infringed plaintiff’s trademark) ; GEICO v. Google , Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d
700, 705 (E.D. Va. 2004) (denying motion to dismiss claim for contributory trademark
infringement because complaint alleged that Internet search engine operator monitored and
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Except for the Lockheed decision and the cases following it, the case law on contributory
trademark infringement tracks fairly closely the general tort law principles of aiding and abetting
liability and inducing tortious conduct found in Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 876(b)184
and 877(a).185 The first part of the Inwood standard that imposes liability on “a manufacturer or
distributor [who] intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark”186 is substantially the
same as the provision for inducing tortious conduct in Restatement (Second) of Torts section
877(a), except that the Inwood standard does not expressly include a requirement for the
defendant to have actual or constructive knowledge that the other person’s conduct is infringing.
The requirement of actual or constructive knowledge should probably be read into the Inwood
standard in order to avoid imposing liability on a defendant who either had a good faith belief
that the other person was not infringing the trademark or else had no reason to know that the
other person was infringing the trademark.
The second part of the Inwood standard that imposes liability on “a manufacturer or
controlled infringing third-party advertisements); Size, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 255 F.
Supp. 2d 568, 572-73 (E.D. Va. 2003) (dismissing contributory trademark infringement action
against NSI because NSI did not supply a product and did not monitor or control use of domain
names); Fare Deals, Ltd. v. World Choice Travel.com, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 688-90 (D. Md.
2001) (affirming summary judgment because defendant did not directly monitor and control
activities of infringing website).
184
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distributor [that] continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is
engaging in trademark infringement” is analogous to the aiding and abetting liability found in
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b).

However, Inwood imposes liability if the

defendant has either actual or constructive knowledge of trademark infringement, while section
876(b) provides for liability only if the defendant has actual knowledge of the infringement. The
distinction between actual and constructive knowledge is probably not very significant in the
context of contributory trademark infringement as a practical matter, because in most cases a
defendant that has reason to know that a customer is infringing a trademark will also have actual
knowledge of the infringement.
The provisions for contributory trademark infringement in the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition187 are also very similar to the general tort law principles of aiding and
abetting liability and inducing tortious conduct found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Since Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition section 27 was based on Inwood, it bears
basically the same resemblance to the general tort law principles of aiding and abetting liability
and inducing tortious conduct found in Restatement (Second) of Torts that Inwood does.

As

noted previously,188 the main difference between section 27 and Inwood is that Inwood imposes
liability on a manufacturer or distributor that continues to supply goods to a customer that it
knows or has reason to know is infringing,189 while section 27 imposes liability only if the
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manufacturer or distributor fails to take reasonable precautions against the infringement in
circumstances where infringement can be reasonably anticipated. Both formulations are broader
than the requirement of actual knowledge in the provision for aiding and abetting liability in
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b), but the differences are probably not very
significant as a practical matter, because in most cases the reason a manufacturer could
reasonably anticipate infringement by its customers is that it has actual knowledge of the
infringement.
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition section 26 provides for contributory
infringement by printers, publishers and other suppliers who reproduce or imitate a trademark on
labels, packaging or advertisements that are used by their customer for trademark infringement.
This provision closely resembles the provision for aiding and abetting liability in Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 876(b), because generally a supplier of labels, packaging or
advertisements would be providing substantial assistance to the trademark infringement.

In

addition, the provision in Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition section 26(2) that limits the
liability to injunctive relief if the printer, publisher or other supplier acted without knowledge
that the customer intended the reproduction or imitation of the trademark to confuse or deceive
essentially imposes an actual knowledge requirement. By the time a court issues an injunction,
the defendant will have actual knowledge of the infringement, and a defendant will not be
subject to a judgment for damages unless it had actual knowledge of the infringement.
The Hard Rock and Fonovisa cases dealing with the liability of operators of flea markets
and swap meets for contributory trademark infringement are completely consistent with the
general tort law principles in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This is not surprising because
60

the opinions in both cases relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts section 877(c),190 which
provides for liability if a defendant permits another person to use the defendant’s premises or
instrumentalities with actual or constructive knowledge that the other person is acting or will act
tortiously.191
Section 877(c) could also be applied to impose liability on a computer network operator
that permitted persons to use the network if the operator had actual or constructive knowledge of
trademark infringement by the users of the network.

Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit in

Lockheed ignored section 877(c) and the general tort principles on which section 877(c) was
based, when it imposed a control requirement, instead of a requirement of actual or constructive
knowledge of infringement, for contributory trademark infringement by computer network
operators. Hopefully, Lockheed will not be followed by other courts.

VI. Conclusion
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Sony, imposing liability on one person for the
conduct of another person is not limited to intellectual property law but is done “in virtually all
areas of the law.”192 Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 876 and 877 encapsulate general tort
law principles that the common law has developed to govern liability for the conduct of another
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person. Section 876(b) imposes liability on an aider and abettor who gives substantial assistance
or encouragement for another to commit a tort with actual knowledge that the other person’s
conduct is tortious. Section 877(a) imposes liability on a person who orders or induces tortious
conduct by another person with either actual or constructive knowledge that the conduct is
tortious. Section 877(c) imposes liability on a person who permits another person to act upon his
premises or with his instrumentalities with either actual or constructive knowledge that the other
person is committing or will commit a tort. The Restatement’s provisions provide the legal
context into which the law for the indirect infringement of intellectual property should fit.
Although the law of indirect infringement derived from common law principles, it has
developed separately in the areas of patent, copyright, and trademark law and independently of
general tort law. Nevertheless, the law of indirect infringement conforms to the general tort law
for the most part. Even though it is governed by statute, the patent law of indirect infringement
probably conforms most closely to the general tort law. The only significant difference between
the patent law of indirect infringement and general tort law is the limitation for contributory
infringement in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) to the sale of products having no substantial noninfringing
uses. In contrast, Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b) would extend aider and abettor
liability to the giving of substantial assistance to patent infringement with actual knowledge of
the infringement.
There is a major discrepancy between indirect infringement in copyright law and the
general tort law, however. This is the doctrine of vicarious liability for copyright infringement
that developed in the dance hall cases and was extended in the Napster case to a computer
network operator. Vicarious liability for copyright infringement was never sound in principle,
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but the imposition of liability for copyright infringement committed by orchestras on the dance
hall proprietors was relatively benign since there were only a limited number of such cases and
they had little significance. The extension of vicarious liability to computer network operators is
more serious, though, and it has generated undesirable uncertainty in an important part of the
world’s economy. The absence of precedent in general tort law for vicarious liability in the
absence of either actual or constructive knowledge of the tortious conduct provides additional
support for limiting or overruling the troublesome doctrine of vicarious liability for copyright
infringement.
It would be anomalous if a defendant were to be indirectly liable for another person’s
direct infringement of intellectual property rights, but not for other torts that the other person
committed, or vice versa. Consequently, the law of indirect infringement should be interpreted
so that it is consistent with the general tort law whenever possible.
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